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William Outhwaite  
Intentional and Reflexive Objectivity: Some Reflectons 
In Section 5 of ‘In Defence of Objectivity’ (pages 166-9), Andrew Collier 
sketches out a distinction between two types of objectivity which leads to the centre 
both of his own thinking and to the issues at stake between realist and related 
positions on the one hand and relativistic, deconstructionist or antifoundationalist 
positions on the other.  As Kate Soper and other contributors to this volume have 
noted, one of the key elements of Collier’s thinking is his stress on a self-distancing 
relation to objects. This emphasis, paralleled by, for example, Adorno’s frequent 
reference to ‘what the object has by itself’, as distinct from our subjectivistic or, 
worse, narcissistic relation to it, or the quotations from Macmurray in section 4, gives 
Collier an interesting and sensitive angle of approach to existentialist thought, 
sharing elements of its critique of excessive reflection and what Kierkegaard called 
calculation, while wishing to curb its excessively voluntaristic approach to knowledge 
and practice. 
Collier attempts to capture this tension in terms of a distinction between 
intentional objectivity, which is object-related in the sense of Brentano and Husserl, 
and a more distanced reflexive objectivity which is driven by questions, often 
sceptical ones, about the nature of our relationship to the alleged object, its status 
and the very possibility of an epistemic or practical relation to it.  Objectivity in this 
second sense needs to be kept in its place;  
It is useful in showing us how intentional objectivity goes wrong – that is, how 
is it that our thoughts and feelings are sometimes merely subjective in the 
sens that they don’t correspond to their objects and are to be explained by the 
nature of the subject rather than that of the object?....[But]  What reflexive 
objectivity can never be is the criterion of intentional objectivity.  (p.168) 
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Collier illustrates this distinction via the difference between science and the 
sociology of science, or between theology and religious studies.   Whether the 
science is good science or not is a scientific question, though the sociologist 
may be able to explain after the event why it was good or bad, and even to 
suggest in advance some reasons why we might reasonably expect it to be 
good or bad.  Similarly, the existence of gods and so forth is a question for 
theology, while the discipline of Religious Studies is concerned with religious 
beliefs, practices and experiences in isolation from their alleged objects. 
A sociologist of science may be a good scientist, but only by switching 
off the sociology; an adept at Religious Studies may be a good 
theologian, but only by switching off the Religious Studies (p.169).   
 
More generally, Collier suggests that  
It is a specific feature of human practice that we can always mnitor 
what we are doing. It is another feature of human practice that we 
always do things worse when we do them reflexively.  A monitored 
activity is a badly done activity (p.169).  
 
In this brief contribution I want to suggest that, while Andrew is on to 
something of unquestionable importance in making this distinction, the ways 
in which he does so are unduly sharp and that the relation is not so much 
between two mutually exclusive types of objectivity between which we can 
only ‘switch’, as a continuum between the wholly unreflective practice which I 
might have called animal if I had not been taught not to by Andrew, Ted 
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Benton, and others, and a reflexivity so intense that it entirely inhibits the 
making of claims about the world or any intervention in it.  And contrary to the 
view that shifts from one kind of objectivity to another are discontinuous, I 
want to suggest the alternative imge of a permanent oscillation between 
different forms of reflexive monitoring relation.  If I were speaking these words 
to you rather than writing them, for example, I would have to pay some more 
or less conscious attention to my level of audibility, and I would be looking for 
reinforcing feedback that I had your attention. Three decades of lecturing to 
more or less impassive audiences does not diminish this desire for feedback, 
and experimental analysis of telephone conversations shows how quickly we 
become nervous if there is no response at all to our monologue.  More 
complicated issues of whether I am writing this text as clearly as possible or 
whether I am deliberately indulging in obscurity in order to impress you are 
not so much an interruption to the writing process as its more or less 
permanent accompaniment.  Higher-order reflections on the nature of 
academic debate in the early twentieth century, the status of realism as a 
philosophical position and the degree to which it is known in different parts of 
the contemporary world, and so on, are also ‘always on’ in the background, as 
I  think about the audience for what I am writing.  In what follows I shall 
illustrate this line of argument a bit more fully in relation to three major 
contemporary social theorists, Jurgen Habermas, Pierre Bourdieu and 
Anthony Giddens, whose work is paradigmatic of the very widespread use of 
the term reflexivity in contemporary thought1, and I shall close with what I 
consider a more problematic and challenging case, that of Karl Mannheim.   
As I have argued elsewhere, the theme of reflection is central to  
Habermas’s thought, and in particular to what he has come to call a model of 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Delanty 1997, May 1999. 
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rational reconstruction.  His early critiques of technocratic and decisionistic 
politics are based on their neglect of reflection, as is his closely related 
critique of positivism.  ‘That we deny reflection is positivism.’  The more 
precise language of rational reconstruction which he develops from the mid-
seventies expresses the epistemic dimension f this approach, while his model 
of communicative action developed at the same time is intended to capture its 
practical dimension.  Habermas understands his theory of communicative 
action not as an abstract normative theory of how we ought to behave, such 
as theories based on an initial decision to 'take the moral point of view', but 
rather as a reconstruction of our existing practices.   As he put it in an 
interview in 1991, 
" ... I am not saying that people should act communicatively, but that they must.   
When parents bring up their children, when living generations appropriate the 
knowledge handed down by their predecessors, when individuals and groups 
cooperate ... they must act communicatively.   There are elementary social 
functions which can only be fulfilled via communicative action.   In our 
intersubjectively shared lifeworlds which overlap with one another there lies a 
broad background consensus without which everyday action simply could not 
work."  
Formal processes of argumentation, whether in everyday life or in specialised 
domains of morality and politics, are the exception, "islands in the sea of praxis".
1
  
 Habermas is therefore rejecting an approach which sees communicative 
action, which he distinguishes from merely self-interested or 'strategic' action, as a 
special activity belonging to a different realm from that of everyday practice.   In 
stressing the pervasiveness of processes of reflection and justification in everyday 
life he is also rejecting the conclusions of Niklas Luhmann's system theory, that 
modern differentiated societies consist of subsystems which have no common 
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language in which to communicate.   At the same time, however, we cannot simply 
affirm the model of individual or collective subjectivity which based on the 
'philosophy of consciousness' derived from Descartes and Kant, in which a subject 
reflects on its relation to its own representations of objects.   Neomarxist 
philosophies of praxis, Habermas believes, remain limited by this perspective, while 
on the other hand many modern theories give up on subjectivity and rationality 
altogether.   What is required is what he calls in The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity "another way out of the philosophy of the subject",
2
 one which 
reconstructs in a more complex intersubjective model the reflective operations 
previously imputed to an isolated subject or logos:  "concrete forms of life replace 
transcendental consciousness in its function of creating unity" 
3
  This model is both 
more abstract and more concrete than more traditional conceptions.   More abstract, 
because the processes of reflection embodied in the public sphere cannot be simply 
localised in an agora or an idealised assembly or set of other institutions, but have to 
be identified throughout the society, like power in Michel Foucault's conception.   
And although, as we have seen, Habermas rejects a simple conception of societies 
as subjects, his conception of "undamaged intersubjectivity" in which he now 
attempts to render the idea of emancipation is grounded in the life-histories, 
retrospective and prospective, of individuals and collectivities.   "Forms of life, like 
life-histories, crystallise around particular identities".
4
 
 The universalism which Habermas upholds does not mean the authoritarian 
imposition of a particular conception with universalistic pretensions.   As he put it in 
an interview in 1988 with Jean-Marc Ferry, 
"What does universalism mean? It means that one relativises one's own form 
of existence in relation to the legitimate claims of other forms of life, that one 
attributes equal rights to the alien and the other, with all their idiosyncrasies 
and incomprehensible aspects, that one does not stick rigidly to the 
universalisation of ones own identity and precisely does not separate out what 
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deviates from it, that the spheres of tolerance must become infinitely wider than 
they are today - all this is what is meant by moral universalism."
5
  
This also means also that our attitude to established structures and traditions can 
only be a cautious and reflective one.   Habermas stressed this earlier in the same 
interview with Ferry:   
"The horror [of the Holocaust] took place without interrupting the peaceful 
breath of everyday life.  Ever since then, a conscious life is no longer possible 
without a mistrust directed at continuities which unquestioningly assert 
themselves and purport to derive their validity from their unquestioned 
character."
6
 
 What Habermas is offering then, is in a sense a philosophy of reflection which 
develops outside the limits of what has traditionally been understood by the 
philosophy of reflection, consciousness and the subject.   It is a philosophy or a 
sociology for a world of the kind described, for example, by Ulrich Beck and Anthony 
Giddens with the notion that modernity has become reflexive.
7
 This is a world in 
which individuals are increasingly thrown onto their own resources to define  their 
own social relations - what Habermas calls "risky self-steering by means of a highly 
abstract ego-identity".
8
   The process itself was built into modernity from the 
beginning and described as such by Max Weber and others at the turn of the 
century, notably in the concept of rationalisation. There has been a tendency to 
stress the promethean and world-making aspect of this process, but the 'moderns' 
captured in Max Weber's concept of ascetic protestantism and in Lucien Goldmann's 
analysis of Jansenism were also racked with anxieties and self-doubt which for 
theological reasons they could not acknowledge.  This negative or tragic 
consciousness of modernity eventually developed, in Romanticism, into aesthetic 
and often ironical forms.  The tension between these two aspects of modernity 
continues, and many of the earlier descriptions, with their contradictory emphases, 
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seem to become truer than ever as modernity develops in its many and varied 
forms.  
 But if Habermas’s models of communicative action and reconstruction, and 
their application in his theories of discourse ethics, discursive democracy and 
constitutional patriotism, involve reflection and reflexivity at all levels, his thinking is 
perhaps uncomfortably dualistic in one aspect of the way in which he theorises 
reflection.  Habermas regularly invokes a distinction, derived no doubt from social 
phenomenology, between a second- and a third-person orientation. example In the 
former, we intract with the other as an interlocutor; in the latter, we move towards a 
more distanced interpretation or explanation of his or her behaviour. Once again, 
however, it seems to me that the complexities of taking the role of the other involve a 
complex interplay between these perspectives, to such an extent that their analytical 
distinctiveness is rapidly obscured, rather as the distinctness of the left- and right 
eye view is effaced in stereoscopic vision.  
 
My second theorist of reflexivity is the late Pierre Bourdieu, who explicitly decribed 
his sociology as reflexive (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992).   Bourdieu has 
increasingly come to define his sociology as reflexive ( Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992; Bourdieu, 1997), and the motif is present even in early works such as Le 
métier de sociologue (1968; 1991).  Bourdieu shows how a vigorously, even brutally, 
Durkheimian and Bachelardian conception of the separation of social science from 
everyday thought can be combined with a sensitivity to issues of reflexivity and a 
non-defeatist strategy for handling them. Bourdieu's rejection of structuralist 
objectivism had been partly driven by an awareness of the gap between formal 
rules, whether located in the heads of actors or those of social scientist, and the 
reality of practice(s).  He was, therefore, suspicious both of sociological 
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commonsense and of actors' concepts, and also of the formal models designed to 
replace them.   
...the sociologist who refuses the controlled, conscious construction of his 
distance from the real and his action on reality may not only impose questions 
on his subjets that their experience does not pose them and omit the questions  
that it does pose them, but he may also naively pose them the questions he 
poses himself about them, through a positivist confusion between the 
questions that objectively arise for them and the questions they consciously 
pose themselves... (Bourdieu et al, 1968: 65; 1991: 38). 
The objectivity of science cannot be built on such shaky foundations as the 
objectivity of scientists.  The gains from epistemological reflection cannot be 
really embodied in practice until the social conditions are established for 
epistemological control, i.e. for a generalized exchange of critiques armed with, 
among other things, the sociology of  sociological practices  (Bourdieu et al, 
1968: 109; 1991: 74). 
For Bourdieu, the sociology of knowledge is no a mere specialist field of the 
subject but rather an essential preliminary and accompaniment to sociological 
investigation.  Like budding psychoanalysts who have to undertake a ‘training 
analysis’ with an established practitioner, all sociologists, he argued, should 
undertake a more or less formal autosocioanalysis.  It is of course no accident that 
Burdieu cut his teeth in ethnographic fieldwork,where the interplay and tension 
between the horizons of expectations of the anthrolplogist and the culture under 
investigation is explicitly thmaised as an epistemic resource.  
 Bourdieu's response to postmodern sociology and anthropology is thus that 
he has been long aware of these issues and drawn more appropriate conclusions. 
He insists that his is an 'anti-narcissitic' reflexivity that 'has little in common with a 
complacent and intimist return upon the private person of the sociologist or with a 
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search for the intellectual Zeitgeist that animates his or her work' (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992: 72).  Such indulgences, like a concentration on the 'poetics' of 
ethnographic writing, 'open[s] the door to a form of thinly disguised nihilistic 
relativism...that stands as the polar opposite to a truly reflexive social science' 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 72).  
 
This can be seen, for example, in his increasingly prominent statements in the  
1980s and onwards about the roles and responsibilities of intellectuals, beginning 
with n interview with Didier eribon in Le Monde in may 1980.  In response to Eribon’s 
suggestion that his polemics in Le Sens pratique & elsewhere come close to anti-
intellectualism, Bourdieu replies with a denunciation of the closed circuits of mutual 
admiration and support which ‘make a Golden Delicious pass for an apple’ and by a 
summary of his more formal analysis of the class position of intellectuals as a 
dominated fraction of the dominant class – this ambiguous situation explaining many 
of the political positions they take up. But he goes on to say that their understanding 
of this situation gives intellectuals a certain possibility of freeing themselves from it – 
‘the privilege to be placed in conditions which enable them to work at understanding 
their specific and generic determinations.  And thereby to liberate themselves from 
them (at least partially) and  to offer means of liberation to others.  The critique of 
intellectuals, if it is a critique, is the other side of a demand (exigence), an 
expectation.’    
Bourdieu’s own critical interventions in the public sphere should be understood in 
this spirit. And in another interview (Le Monde, March 14, 1992) he suggests: ‘There 
is no effective democracy without a true critical countervailing power.  The 
intellectual is one, and of the first importance…. I wish that writers, artists, 
philosophers and scientists could get a hearing in all the areas of public life in which 
they are competent. I believe that everyone could benefit a lot from the extension 
into political life of the logic of intellectual life, of argumentation and refutation.  
Today, it is the logic of politics, that of denunciation and defamation, which often 
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spreads into intellectual life. It would be good for the ‘creators’ to fulfil their function 
of a public service and sometimes of public safety’.  
Bourdieu’s model of reflexive sociology has been enormously fruitful in his own and 
others’ research.  Like Habermas, however, he displays a certain inflexibility in one 
aspect which must surely be central to any reflexive sociology; the lay sociology 
practised by social actors themselves.  Again the psychoanalytic comparison is 
relevant: lay sociology, like lay (self-) analysis is seen as an object of suspicion and 
a likely source of distortion. 
 
On this issue Giddens is a good deal more flexible. 
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